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Abstract
The last couple of  decades have seen a considerable increase in the sub-
mittal of  investment claims to Arbitral Tribunals, a process which has often 
been linked to the “proliferation” of  investment treaties. Alongside, a debate 
on the so-called “legitimacy” of  the Investor-State dispute settlement me-
chanism has emerged – and prompted calls for reform – refusing, for the 
moment, to go away. Treaty interpretation has not been in the forefront of  
discussion. Authorized (“authoritative”) interpretation – as performed by 
Arbitral Tribunals – is perhaps one of  the issues of  least (if  any) concern. 
This Article explores the multiple issues arising from vesting excessive signi-
ficance in authorized interpretations of  Investor-State Arbitral Tribunals (in 
the events in which States Parties to the relevant investment treaty do not 
have opposing views on the construction of  a conventional clause) vis-à-vis 
the distinction between authentic and authorized interpretation. Drawing on 
the referral to the notable cases in which this issue has arisen, this Article 
will present a few recommendations.
Keywords: International Arbitration. Authentic Interpretation. Internatio-
nal Investment Law. Authoritative Interpretation. Law of  Treaties
Resumo 
Nas duas últimas décadas, houve um aumento considerável na apresenta-
ção de pedidos de investimento a Tribunais Arbitrais, um processo que tem 
sido frequentemente ligado à “proliferação” de tratados de investimento. Pa-
ralelamente, surgiu um debate sobre a chamada “legitimidade” do mecanis-
mo de solução de controvérsias entre o investidor e o Estado - e provocou 
pedidos de reforma - recusando-se, por enquanto, a desaparecer. A interpre-
tação do tratado não esteve na linha de frente da discussão. A interpretação 
autorizada (“autoritoria”) - como realizada pelos Tribunais de Arbitragem - 
é talvez uma das questões de menos (ou nenhuma) preocupação. Este artigo 
explora as múltiplas questões decorrentes da aquisição de significância ex-
cessiva em interpretações autorizadas de tribunais de arbitragem Investidor-
-Estado (nos eventos em que os Estados-Partes no tratado de investimento 
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relevante não têm visões opostas sobre a construção de 
uma cláusula convencional) vis-à-vis a distinção entre in-
terpretação autêntica e autorizada. Com base no enca-
minhamento para os casos notáveis em que esta questão 
surgiu, este artigo apresentará algumas recomendações.
Palavras-chave : Arbitragem Internacional. Interpre-
tação Autêntica. Lei de Investimento Internacional. In-
terpretação autorizada. Lei dos Tratados.
1 Introduction
The proliferation1 of  investment treaties has resulted 
in an increase in the submittal of  claims to Investor-Sta-
te Arbitral Tribunals2. In this “golden age”3 for invest-
ment arbitration, insufficient attention has been paid to 
the distinctions between “authorized interpretations”4, 
performed by international arbitral tribunals, and the 
“authentic interpretation” issued by States Parties to in-
vestment treaties.
Investment arbitration was established as, and re-
mains, an adversarial process between – almost exclusi-
vely – an investor, national of  one of  the States Parties, 
and the other State Party. Inter-State (State to State) 
investment disputes are, thus, atypical5. Authorized 
interpretations performed by Investor-State Arbitral 
Tribunals do entail differences in significance vis-à-vis 
authorized interpretations issued by Inter-State dispute 
1 See WELLHAUSEN, Rachel L. Recent Trends in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement, Journal of  International Dispute Settlement, v. 7, n. 
1, p. 117-135, Jan. 2016.
2 See JOHNSON JUNIOR. Thomas; GIMBLETT, Jonathan. 
Gunboats to BITs: the Evolution of  Modern International Invest-
ment Law. In: SAUVANT, Karl P. Yearbook on International Investment 
Law and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. P. 649-686.
3 The term “golden age” has been employed by Theodore R. Posner 
and Dániel Dózsa in their Article: The Enduring Role of  Diplomacy and 
Other Tools of  State-State Dispute Resolution in a Golden Age of  Investor-
State Arbitration, Weil World Arbitration Report, 2-9 (2013).
4 The concept of  “interprétation autorisée” or “interpretación autori-
zada” is, often, translated into English as “authoritative interpretation”. 
The Author prefers to employ the terms “authorized interpretation”, 
reflective of  a more accurate translation of  the concept. - The 
expression “authoritative interpretation” suggests a construction 
which is peremptory and definitive in nature, hence, unquestionable 
by States Parties. 
5 Prior to the establishment of  international arbitration as the 
fundamental Investor-State dispute resolution mechanism (when 
– naturally – no “modern” bilateral investment treaties were in 
force), diplomatic protection (either through State-to-State negotia-
tions or inter-State litigation) was the mean to address concerns over 
the “inadequate” treatment of  aliens and its property.
settlement mechanisms. 
Not much academic debate has emerged with re-
gard to the referred distinction6. The foundations of  
the Investor-State dispute settlement mechanism reflect 
a hypothesis of  “opposing” or “conflicting” views of  
the parties to the dispute (investor v. State) “matching” 
or “mirroring” the (presumed) opposing or conflicting 
views of  the States Parties to the investment treaty. 
The overwhelming majority of  these type of  treaties 
in force do not include express provisions in relation to 
the exercise of  authentic interpretation by States Par-
ties. Some commentators7 argue the absence of  such 
express provisions is aligned with the overall goal of  
“depolitization” of  investment disputes, considering it 
“allows” States Parties not to adopt a position in every 
single investment dispute that arises. 
As a result of  the current debate on the “convenien-
ce”, “legitimacy” and “balance” of  the Investor-State 
dispute settlement mechanism8, a critical approach to 
the rather orthodox (and not greatly disputed) under-
taking towards the authorized interpretations of  Inves-
tor-State Arbitral Tribunals has become more relevant 
than ever. The criticism and negative narrative with 
regard to investment arbitration is clear and present 
across the globe, with notable disapproval from key 
players in Europe, Latin America and – most recently 
– North America.
This Article departs from the traditional view of  au-
thorized interpretations by Investor-State Arbitral Tri-
bunals as a “settled matter”9, in which the “preeminent 
6 The matter was, somewhat, perceived as overcome with the in-
clusions –in investment treaties– of  the following clauses: “The non-
disputing Party may make oral and written submissions to the tribunal regarding 
the interpretation of  this Treaty” and “A joint decision of  the Parties, each 
acting through its representative designated for purposes of  this Article, declar-
ing their interpretation of  a provision of  this Treaty shall be binding on a 
tribunal”.
7 See, inter alia, REISMAN, W. Michael. Opinion with respect to juris-
diction in the Interstate Arbitration initiated by Ecuador against the United 
States, 2012. Available at: https://www.italaw.com/cases/docu-
ments/1498.
8 See, inter alia, the controversy that arose on the occasion of  the 
International Bar Association’s “International Arbitration Day”, 
which took place on 27 February 2015, as a result of  The Wash-
ington Post’s Article “The Trans-Pacific Partnership clause everyone should 
oppose”. The matter has consistently emerged in every other forum 
held afterwards, including the most recent edition of  the Interna-
tional Law Association’s “International Law Weekend”, which took 
place on 28 October 2016.
9 See, inter alia, REISMAN, W. Michael. Opinion with respect to juris-
diction in the Interstate Arbitration initiated by Ecuador against the United 
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nature” of  the latter (with respect to the construction of  
conventional clauses enshrined in investment treaties) is 
unquestionable. After briefly explaining the distinction 
between authentic interpretations and authorized inter-
pretations – in abstracto –, this Article will illustrate the 
particular issues arising from vesting excessive signifi-
cance10 in authorized interpretations of  Investor-State 
Arbitral Tribunals, in the events in which States Par-
ties (“Home” and “Host” States) do not have oppo-
sing views on the construction of  a particular clause. 
Drawing on the referral to the notable cases in which 
this issue has arisen, this Article will present pertinent 
conclusions and submit appropriate recommendations. 
2 Treaty Interpretation
Customary international law on the law of  treaties, 
as reflected on the Vienna Convention of  the Law of  Trea-
ties (1969), codifies certain rules on treaty interpretation. 
Article 31 enshrines the “general rule on treaty inter-
pretation”; Article 32 discusses the recourse to “sup-
plementary means of  interpretation”; and Article 33 
crystalizes the rules on interpretation of  treaties “au-
thenticated in two or more languages”.
As to the general rule on treaty interpretation (which 
states that a treaty shall be interpreted “in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of  the treaty in their context and in light of  its 
object and purpose”), some of  the most highly qualified 
publicists, have stated that such provision: 
Gives no greater weight to one particular factor, 
such as the text (‘textual’ or ‘literal’ approach), 
or the supposed intentions of  the parties, or the 
object and purpose of  the treaty (‘effective’ or 
‘teleological’ approach). Placing undue emphasis 
on the text, without regard to what the parties 
intended; or on what the parties are believed to 
have intended, regardless of  the text; or on the 
perceived object and purpose in order to make the 
treaty more ‘effective’, irrespective of  the intentions 
of  the parties, is unlikely to produce a satisfactory 
result11.
States, 2012. Available at: https://www.italaw.com/cases/docu-
ments/1498.
10 Some Commentators consider that, in certain cases, the Arbitral 
Tribunal’s decision not only has clashed with (apparent) authentic 
interpretations issued by States Parties, but rather prevailed. This is 
the case of, inter alia, CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, which 
will be addressed in detail below.   
11 AUST, Anthony. Handbook of  International Law, first edition, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2005. See also SHAW, Malcom N. 
International Law, sixth edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008: “any true interpretation of  a treaty in international law will have 
2.1  Authentic Interpretation vis-à-vis 
Authorized Interpretation
In the realm of  investment law, as opposed to other 
fields of  public international law, only States          – as 
original subjects of  international law – may sign and be 
parties to investment treaties, whether these internatio-
nal instruments are bilateral (the substantial majority) 
or multilateral12. Consequently, for the purposes of  this 
Article, the authentic interpretation hereby referred will 
be that of  States Parties13.
Authentic interpretation of  a treaty is the process 
by which the subjects of  international law that adopted 
and subsequently became parties to the international 
instrument construe a particular conventional provision 
thereof.
Authentic interpretation is a prerogative. Accordin-
gly, States Parties may exercise it, at any time, as long 
as the treaty is in force between them. Authentic in-
terpretation may be “collective” or “individual”14. The 
latter allows subjects of  international law to make their 
own interpretation of  a clause, “indicating the meaning they 
attribute to the text of  a treaty”. By contrast, “collective 
authentic interpretation” is the construction made by 
of  all of  the States Parties to the treaty.
Authorized interpretation is, par excellence, not au-
thentic. An Authorized interpretation is a construction 
of  a conventional provision made by an “impartial” 
international adjudicatory mechanism, in a concrete 
case where States Parties to the treaty have different, 
divergent, conflicting or opposed interpretations to an 
investor. Some commentators argue authorized inter-
pretations do not “create” law, as these constructions 
are, inter alia, “only enforceable against the parties in litigation 
to take into account all aspects of  the agreement, from the words employed to 
the intention of  the parties and the aims of  the particular document. It is not 
possible to exclude completely any one of  these components”.
12 Some commentators distinguish between bilateral, multilateral 
and “plurilateral” treaties. However, “plurilateral” treaties are, essen-
tially, multilateral treaties with fewer States. For the purpose of  this 
article, treaties among more than two states will be referred to as 
“multilateral”. 
13 Other subjects of  international law with treaty-making capac-
ity (e.g., international cooperation organizations), have not (and, 
most likely, cannot) enter into investment treaties, because of, inter 
alia,limitations on the concept of  “territory”.
14 Certain commentators refer to the “individual” authentic in-
terpretation as “unilateral”, see MAFTEI, Jana; LICUTA COMAN, 
Varvara. Interpretation of  Treaties. 2012. p. 16-30. Acta Universitatis 
Danubius Juridica, Danubius University. 
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and only in the case in question”15. Be that as it may, collecti-
ve authentic interpretations (regardless of  whether it is 
classified as an instrument made by one or more parties 
of  the Treaty in connection with the treaty or a subse-
quent agreement), do produce law.
2.2  The inherent problem with the authorized 
interpretations of Investor-State Arbitral 
Tribunals
It is worth noting that this Article does not purport 
to criticize Investor-State Arbitration, as the primary 
and one of  the most effective dispute settlement me-
chanisms for investment controversies. Nevertheless, 
the problems in relation to the construction of  conven-
tional clauses by Investor-State Arbitral Tribunals arise 
out of  the very nature of  this dispute settlement me-
chanism. These problems are explained in detail below.
Unlike Inter-State adjudication mechanisms (e.g., the 
International Court of  Justice), in Investor-State Arbi-
tral Tribunals the parties to the dispute are not the same 
as the Parties to the treaty. These circumstances impact 
the fundamental distinction between authentic interpre-
tation and authorized interpretation of  a treaty.
In Inter-State disputes, States Parties to a treaty have 
different, divergent, conflicting or opposed authentic 
interpretations on a conventional clause. Thus, each of  
them confer to the international adjudicatory mecha-
nism capacity to exercise and issue an authorized inter-
pretation over their different, divergent, conflicting or 
opposed authentic interpretations, for the purposes of  
the dispute (by means of  either a compromissory clause 
or of  a separate subsequent agreement16).
In Investor-State Arbitration proceedings, as States 
Parties to the investment treaty are not the parties to 
the dispute (only one is, against whom the proceedings 
were instituted), the Arbitral Tribunal’s authorized in-
terpretation is imperfect. Although States that are par-
ty to a treaty conferred the capacity to an international 
adjudication mechanism for the exercise and issuance 
of  an authorized interpretation, such capacity does not 
15 Certain commentators refer to the individual authentic inter-
pretation as “unilateral”, see MAFTEI, Jana; LICUTA COMAN, 
Varvara. Interpretation of  Treaties. 2012. p. 16-30. Acta Universitatis 
Danubius Juridica, Danubius University.
16 On the general legal nature of  “subsequent agreements” see, inter 
alia, SHAW, Malcom N. International Law, sixth edition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008.
arise from different, divergent, conflicting or opposed 
authentic interpretations. In fact, States that are Parties 
to the treaty might not even disagree on the construc-
tion of  a conventional clause – but only one of  them17 
sits in the proceedings18.
Investment treaties are, largely, bilateral. Multilate-
ral investment treaties19 are, therefore, exceptional. This 
fact has, likewise, effects on both the authentic interpre-
tation of  States Parties and the authorized interpretation 
of  international arbitral tribunals. In any treaty, the “on-
-going confidence in shared interpretation” is what causes the 
treaty to continue in force, as the initial “will” of  States 
Parties may be “volatile” (or change as time elapses). Bi-
lateral treaties, moreover, require a continued “meeting 
of  the minds”, as reservations and/or conditional inter-
pretative declarations are not applicable. Consent rests 
on a “common understanding” of  what was agreed on 
each conventional clause. If  the Investor-State Arbitral 
Tribunal’s authorized interpretation of  a provision does 
not consult the collective authentic interpretation, the 
consent is eroded. This problem will be addressed in 
detail in Section five below.
2.3  Interpretation of conventional provisions in 
a non-formal stare decisis system: is absence 
of “precedent” a myth? 
One might be inclined to question why an authorized 
interpretation would be a problem, when Investor-State 
Arbitral Tribunals are not “required”20 to be consistent 
with or cohere to prior decisions, as international in-
vestment arbitration is not a uniform legal system with 
“formal precedent”.
The practice of  Investor-State Arbitral Tribunals 
has evidenced (and continues to evidence) that, in spite 
of  the absence of  a conventional provision instituting 
17 Evidently, the other party to the dispute is a “national” of  the 
other State (who does not have any treaty authentic interpretation 
capacities).
18 For a discussion on mechanisms and procedural opportunities 
of  the other State Party (which is not a party to the dispute) to cana-
lize its individual authentic interpretation of  a conventional clause, 
see Section 4 infra. 
19 A common example of  a multilateral investment treaty in force 
is the Energy Charter Treaty (1994). Other multilateral treaties in force, 
also agreed in regional or sub-regional spheres, include the Additional 
Protocol to the Framework Agreement on the Pacific Alliance (2014).
20 By means of  a compulsory or mandatory provision, enshrined 
in either the applicable conventional law or the procedural rules ap-
plicable to the particular dispute.
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formal precedent (stare decisis)21, not a single of  the con-
temporary decisions fails to refer to: (a) prior extracts 
from awards (dictums); (b) the main legal underpinnings 
(ratio decidendi) thereof; or (c) operative parts of  such de-
cisions22. 
International arbitral tribunals are not “formally” 
obliged to follow a prior decision in which a construc-
tion of  a particular investment treaty was given. Howe-
ver, when Investor-State Arbitral Tribunals purport to 
depart from a prior decision’s rationale – including the 
interpretation of  a conventional clause – they nonethe-
less provide substantial legal explanations for that de-
parture.
The once accurate division of  States Parties to in-
vestment treaties as “capital-exporting”, on the one 
hand, and “capital-receptor and less-developed”, on the 
other has faded. This has to do with the proliferation of  
investment treaties. The initial rationale of  these treaties 
serving (solely) the interests of  capital-exporting States’ 
nationals (i.e. resort to an international dispute settle-
ment mechanism instead of  the local courts of  “uncivi-
lized States”), has become less and less correct. Invest-
ment treaties have increasingly been concluded between 
States that are, simultaneously, capital-exporting States 
and capital-receptor States (considered as “similarly de-
veloped”). These circumstances have an impact on the 
construction of  conventional clauses enshrined in in-
vestment treaties.
If  an investor of  a State Party (Home State) brings 
a claim against the other State Party (Host State), and a 
construction of  a clause of  the applicable investment 
treaty is provided by an Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal; 
when an investor of  the latter State (no longer Host 
State, now Home State) brings a claim against the first 
State Party (and in the new dispute the relevant pro-
vision is the conventional clause that was previously 
interpreted by an Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal); no 
one would doubt that there is non-dismissible “antece-
dent” in relation to the construction of  the conventio-
nal clause, in light of  the first case. This situation would 
21 See, inter alia, SCHEFER, Krista Nadakavukaren. International 
Investment Law. 2. ed. Switzerland: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2013. 
p. 57.
22 See, inter alia, CONFORTI, Benedetto; FOCARELLI, Carlo. 
The Law and Practice of  the United Nations. 4. ed. Brill – Nijhoff, 
2010. p. 178. Also see, inter alia, TIERSMA, Peter M. Legal Language. 
Chicago and London: The University of  Chicago Press, 1999. p. 
119. (Paperback edition).
have been “unthinkable” in light of  the initial rationale 
of  these treaties serving (solely) the interests of  capital-
-exporting States’ nationals; the later dispute would not 
have been plausible. 
“Antecedent” is not equivalent to “formal prece-
dent”. There is no contention in that affirmation. An 
antecedent, notwithstanding the above, is a not entirely 
irrelevant for international arbitral tribunals, in light of  
their continued practice. 
The fact is that there would be a prior authorized 
interpretation of  a conventional clause in the corpus juris 
or realm of  international investment law. The practice 
indicates, in spite of  the lexicon employed by the rele-
vant provisions applicable23 to Investor-State arbitration 
proceedings, that international arbitral tribunals would, 
undoubtedly, refer to such prior construction24. 
3  The tension between authentic 
interpretations and authorized 
interpretations in Arbitral Awards: a 
critical approach
A number of  cases address the question of  authen-
tic interpretation of  States Parties is present in inter-
national arbitral proceedings. In some of  these cases25, 
the dispute-settlement mechanism is – solely – State to 
State. Thus, the matter is outside the scope of  this Arti-
cle, as is a situation where States Parties to a treaty have 
different, divergent, conflicting or opposed authentic 
interpretations on a clause and, therefore, each of  them 
confer to the international adjudicatory mechanism ca-
pacity to exercise and issue an authorized interpretation 
23 Inter alia, Article 53, Section 1, of  the “Convention on the Settlement 
of  Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of  other States” (1965), 
within the International Center for Settlement of  Investment Dis-
putes.
24 Beyond a matter of  mere “colleague-deference” referrals, see e.g. 
Saipem S.p.A. v. The People´s Republic of  Bangladesh (at the Decision on 
Jurisdiction of  March 21, 2007, paragraph 67) and Caratube International 
Oil Company LLP v. The Republic of  Kazakhstan (at the Decision on Pro-
visional Measures of  July 31, 2009, paragraph 73).
25 See AD HOC STATE-STATE ARBITRATION, Italian Repub-
lic v. Republic of  Cuba (Cuba – Italy Bilateral Investment Treaty). 
As in any other Inter-State dispute, States Parties to a treaty (with 
different, divergent, conflicting or opposed authentic interpreta-
tions on a clause of  a treaty) confer to the international adjudicatory 
mechanism capacity to exercise and issue an authorized interpreta-
tion over their different, divergent, conflicting or opposed authentic 
interpretations. 
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over their different, divergent, conflicting or opposed 
authentic interpretations. There is no issue, from the 
perspective of  this Article, in those circumstances. 
To the contrary, situations in which the following 
issues arise do present a problem with regard to the 
understanding of  what the authentic interpretation of  
States Parties entails vis-à-vis the (imperfect) authorized 
interpretation of  an Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal:
(i) The issue of  a genuine collective authentic inter-
pretation of  States Parties, in Investor-State arbitration 
proceedings (where only one of  them is a party to the 
dispute), before or after an authorized interpretation 
has been provided – inter alia, in a partial arbitral award, 
but prior to the conclusion of  investment arbitration 
proceedings. [3.1]
(ii) The issue of  a State Party’s alleged claim of  a 
collective authentic interpretation, in Investor-State 
arbitration proceedings (where such State Party to the 
treaty is the only non-alien party to the dispute), before 
or after an authorized interpretation has been provided 
– inter alia, in a partial arbitral award – but prior to the 
conclusion of  investment arbitration proceedings. [3.2]
(iii) The issue of  genuine or alleged collective au-
thentic interpretations, after the investment arbitration 
proceedings have been concluded and, evidently, a final 
authorized interpretation has been issued for the pur-
poses of  the dispute. [3.3]
These three scenarios will be the object of  this Sec-
tion. Opposing or conflicting authentic interpretations 
by States Parties, in Investor-State arbitration procee-
dings (mirroring different views of  the Investor, on the 
one hand, and Host State, on the other), before an au-
thorized interpretation has been provided – inter alia, 
in a partial arbitral award – are not to be referred here, 
considering those circumstances are, precisely, the situa-
tions envisioned at the moment of  the establishment of  
the Investor-State dispute settlement mechanism.26 
26 None of  the bilateral investment treaties invoked in the cases 
referenced below include authentic or authorized interpretation 
clauses. 
3.1  With regard to the first issue, referred as the 
situation where genuine collective authentic 
interpretations are presented in Investor-
State arbitration proceedings, before or 
after the international arbitral tribunal has 
provided an authorized interpretation, 
but prior to the conclusion of the case, the 
notable decision is CME Czech Republic B.V. v. 
Czech Republic. 
In this particular investment dispute a partial arbitral 
award was rendered against the Czech Republic, a State 
Party to the applicable investment treaty. As a result of  
the Czech Republic’s subsequent request, both States 
Parties, the Czech Republic and the Kingdom of  the 
Netherlands, entered into bilateral consultations, throu-
gh the diplomatic channels, on the “meaning” of  cer-
tain conventional provisions. The States Parties agreed 
on an interpretation and signed an international instru-
ment entitled “Agreed Minutes”. The Arbitral Tribunal 
– after being presented with the latter agreement on 
the authentic interpretation of  treaty provisions – nei-
ther accredited nor recognized the significance of  the 
“Agreed Minutes”, even though the arbitral tribunal sta-
ted that it reached the “same” conclusion. Some Com-
mentators may even suggest the Arbitral Tribunals not 
only neither accredited nor recognized the appropriate 
significance to the “Agreed Minutes”, but assigned that 
instrument a “non-essential value” for the process of  
reaching a decision.27 
The arbitral tribunal’s assertion is controversial. 
However, the process of  recognizing ‘appropriate sig-
nificance’ demands “giving no greater weight to one 
particular factor, such as the text or object and purpo-
se of  the treaty, over the context or intentions of  the 
parties”28, with the understanding that “placing undue 
emphasis on the text, without regard to what the parties 
intended [in, inter alia, a subsequent agreement] regard-
less of  the text; or on the perceived object and purpose 
27 See, inter alia, REISMAN, W. Michael. Opinion with respect to ju-
risdiction in the Interstate Arbitration initiated by Ecuador against the United 
States, 2012. Available at: https://www.italaw.com/cases/docu-
ments/1498.
28 AUST, Anthony. Handbook of  International Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2005. See also SHAW, Malcom N. International 
Law. 6. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008: “any true 
interpretation of  a treaty in international law will have to take into account all 
aspects of  the agreement, from the words employed to the intention of  the parties 
and the aims of  the particular document. It is not possible to exclude completely 
any one of  these components”.
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in order to make the treaty more ‘effective’, irrespective 
of  the intentions of  the parties, is unlikely to produce 
a satisfactory result”29. The Arbitral Tribunal appears 
to have forgotten that the treaty   – whose authorized 
interpretation was entrusted to it – binds two States, 
both of  whom agreed on what conventional provisions 
meant and how should they be construed. When there 
is collective authentic interpretation, by “all” of  the Sta-
tes Parties, there is no room for an authorized interpre-
tation, where evidently there are no different, divergent, 
conflicting or opposed views between the subjects of  
international law for whom the treaty is in force30. The 
Arbitral Tribunal was precluded from reaching its own 
decision, even if, in the case under examination, the 
conclusion was the same.
3.2  In relation to the second issue, pertaining to 
a State Party’s alleged claim of a collective 
authentic interpretation of a clause, before 
or after an authorized interpretation was 
provided – inter alia, in a partial arbitral 
award – but prior to the conclusion of 
investment arbitration proceedings, some 
reflections must, first, be addressed. 
The Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal (unlike the 
events in which there is a genuine collective authentic 
interpretation of  States Parties) remains “entitled” to 
issue an authorized interpretation if  the non-alleging 
State Party does not positively concur in the assertion 
of  there being a collective authentic interpretation. In 
addition to the above, in the event the other State Party 
(which is not a party to the dispute) is given a “procedu-
ral opportunity” to intervene (when the construction of  
a conventional clause is in question in Investor-State ar-
bitration proceedings and there is a concrete allegation 
by the other State Party of  a “misconstruction” by the 
29 AUST, Anthony. Handbook of  International Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2005. See also SHAW, Malcom N. International 
Law. 6. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. “any true 
interpretation of  a treaty in international law will have to take into account all 
aspects of  the agreement, from the words employed to the intention of  the parties 
and the aims of  the particular document. It is not possible to exclude completely 
any one of  these components”.
30 The question of  the investor (national of  the State Party, as 
Home State) and the other State Party (Host State), being the par-
ties of  the dispute (in the Investor-State arbitral proceedings), does 
not change the fact that the investor has no authentic interpretation 
capacities and that the international instrument whose construction 
is required is the applicable investment treaty (which is between two 
States).
Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal), certain consequences 
shall arise.
There are three noteworthy cases with regard to the 
second issue. The alleging State Party chose a different 
path in each of  them. The first one is Aguas del Tunari, 
S.A. v. Republic of  Bolivia (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3), in 
which the respondent alleged, before the Investor-State 
Arbitral Tribunal had issued an authorized interpreta-
tion, that there was a collective authentic interpretation 
by the States Parties. The former Republic of  Bolivia 
(today, Plurinational State of  Bolivia) argued that there 
was a “subsequent agreement” between the two Sta-
tes, on the interpretation of  a conventional provision, 
arising from certain (three separate) statements made 
by the Government of  the Kingdom of  the Nether-
lands, read in conjunction with the former Republic 
of  Bolivia’s own construction of  the clause. The King-
dom of  the Netherlands, in response to the Investor-
-State Arbitral Tribunal’s request, affirmed it was not 
of  the view that the statements (some of  which con-
tradicted themselves), together with the former Repu-
blic of  Bolivia’s interpretation, formed a “subsequent 
agreement”31. The Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal sta-
ted that there was “no intent” for those statements to 
be regarded as an “agreement” and proceeded to issue 
an authorized interpretation of  the relevant conventio-
nal clause. 
The decision of  the Arbitral Tribunal was correct: in 
absence of  genuine collective authentic interpretation32, 
the presumption should be that individual authentic in-
terpretations are opposed (each one of  them equiva-
lent to the positions of  the parties to the dispute) and 
– consequently – the Arbitral Tribunal must issue an 
authorized interpretation. A different matter, however, 
emerges with regard to the effects of  the declination (to 
furnish express observations on its authentic interpre-
tation) for the Kingdom on the Netherlands, a situation 
which will be referred – in abstracto – in Section 6 infra.
In the second case, Empresas Luchetti, S.A. & Luc-
chetti Peru, S.A. v. Republic of  Peru (ICSID Case No. 
31 The Kingdom of  the Netherlands rather conveyed a copy of  a 
document entitled “Interpretation of  the Agreement on encouragement and 
reciprocal protection of  investments”, which – in spite of  its title – did not 
entail the legal nature of  a subsequent agreement on the interpreta-
tion of  the bilateral investment treaty.
32 That is, when only one of  the States Parties alleges the existence 
of  a collective authentic interpretation, without there being a prima 
facie subsequent written agreement between the States Parties.
D
ÍA
Z
-C
E
D
IE
L,
 S
an
tia
go
. A
rb
itr
al 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
of
 in
ve
st
m
en
t t
re
at
ies
: p
ro
bl
em
s a
nd
 re
m
ed
ies
 fo
r t
he
 d
eb
at
e 
on
 “
leg
iti
m
ac
y”
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
16
, n
. 1
, p
. 7
3-
88
, 2
01
9
81
ARI3/03/04), after the investor had filed a claim for 
international investment arbitration, the Republic of  
Peru instituted proceedings against the Republic of  
Chile (Inter-State dispute resolution mechanism), prior 
to the issuance of  an authorized interpretation by the 
Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal. The Republic of  Peru 
requested the suspension of  the Investor-State arbitral 
proceedings until the Inter-State arbitral proceedings 
were concluded, but the Investor-State Arbitral Tribu-
nal moved forward. The Inter-State arbitral proceedings 
were, afterwards, discontinued. Certain commentators 
disqualify the actions of  the State Party (the Republic 
of  Peru) as a mere attempt to “politicize” an investment 
dispute33. This is a rather simplistic assertion. 
Inter-State arbitration is a legitimate dispute settle-
ment mechanism in international law. If  the other State 
Party (against whom the proceedings were instituted) 
does not object to the jurisdiction of  the Arbitral Tribu-
nal – and wants to obtain an authorized interpretation 
too – an Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal hearing a (pa-
rallel) dispute between an investor of  that State Party 
and the other State Party, should accord the appropriate 
deference to the implications of  an authorized inter-
pretation being requested by the two States Parties to 
the investment treaty (in light of  their different, diver-
gent, conflicting or opposed authentic interpretations), 
over its own authorized interpretation for the separate 
dispute. There is nothing “political” in seeking to find 
additional assurances on the common understanding, 
when the meeting of  the minds is in question. The so-
-called “two-track” system – a commentator’s construc-
tion – cannot serve as an excuse to invalidate or ignore 
the fact that the investment treaty binds the States Par-
ties and is their mutual comprehension on what are the 
international conventional obligations thereof  agreed 
what gives rise to subsequent breaches to an investor. 
Put it in another way, if  the States Parties agree that 
a particular situation or set of  facts are not, without 
reasonable doubt, encompassed under a conventional 
clause (and, therefore, an authorized interpretation on 
their different, divergent, conflicting or opposed au-
thentic interpretations is solicited), the Investor-State 
33 See ORECKI, Marcin. State-to-State Arbitration pursuant to Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties: the Ecuador-US Dispute, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.youngicca-blog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
State_to_State_Marcin_Orecki_10_02_201.pdf. See also REISMAN, 
W. Michael. Opinion with respect to jurisdiction in the Interstate Ar-
bitration initiated by Ecuador against the United States, 2012. Avail-
able at: https://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/1498.
Arbitral Tribunal should not move forward with the 
separate proceedings. Moreover, if  the States Parties 
concur on the affirmation that an investor’s claim is not 
encompassed in their common understanding or “in-
tent” of  the conventional clause34, a subsequent autho-
rized interpretation has no further room. A provision 
addressing these circumstances, to date, missing from 
both the majority of  investment treaties and applicable 
procedural rules. 
The third case is Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum 
Co. v. Republic of  Ecuador, in which Investor-State Arbi-
tral Tribunal issued an authorized interpretation of  a 
provision of  the applicable bilateral investment treaty, 
in a partial award. The Republic of  Ecuador then insti-
tuted proceedings against the United States of  Ameri-
ca – Republic of  Ecuador v. United States of  America (PCA 
Case No. 2012-5) –. The Republic of  Ecuador’s claim 
was that the Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal had erred 
in its construction of  the conventional clause, because 
the collective authentic interpretation was different35. 
The Inter-State arbitration claim was dismissed on the 
basis of  lack of  jurisdiction36. Nevertheless, the Repu-
blic of  Ecuador’s actions were highly criticized because 
– in some commentators’ views37 –  the submittal of  a 
34 That is, if  the States Parties agree that the claim of  an investor 
should be dismissed.
35 The Republic of  Ecuador’s initial claim comprised an affir-
mation of  the Investor-State’s Arbitral Tribunal having issued an 
authorized interpretation that was not in accordance with the col-
lective authentic interpretation of  States Parties. Prior to instituting 
proceedings against the United States of  America, the Republic of  
Ecuador requested (through the diplomatic channels) an individual 
authentic interpretation of  the United States of  America with re-
gard to the relevant conventional clause, stating that “if  such a con-
firming note [was] not forthcoming or otherwise the Illustrious Government of  
the United States does not agree with the interpretation of  Article 11.7 of  the 
Treaty by the Government of  the Republic of  Ecuador, an unresolved dispute 
must be considered to exist between the Government of  the Republic of  Ecuador 
and the Government of  the United States of  America concerning the interpreta-
tion and application of  the Treaty”. 
36 See Department State of  the United States of  America – Office 
of  the Legal Adviser –, U.S.-Ecuador BIT: Ecuador v. United States, 
available at: http://www.state.gov/s/l/c53491.htm. “On June 28, 
2011, the Republic of  Ecuador instituted arbitral proceedings against the Unit-
ed States concerning the interpretation and application of  the Treaty between 
the United States of  America and the Republic of  Ecuador Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment, August 27, 1993, 
pursuant to Article VII of  the Treaty. In an award dated September 29, 2012, 
the Arbitral Tribunal, by majority, dismissed the case for lack of  jurisdiction, 
‘due to the absence of  the existence of  a dispute falling within the ambit of  
Article VII of  the Treaty’”.
37 See, inter alia, REISMAN, W. Michael. Opinion with respect to juris-
diction in the Interstate Arbitration initiated by Ecuador against the United 
States, 2012. Available at: https://www.italaw.com/cases/docu-
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claim for the purpose of  “re-construing” a treaty provi-
sion (after an authorized interpretation was previously 
issued by an Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal in separate 
proceedings), violated the principle of  res judicata and, 
ultimately, defeated the purpose of  Investor-State arbi-
tration. Those concerns are shared to a certain extent.
Although it is clear that choosing the “means” by 
which the States Parties may agree on a collective au-
thentic interpretation rests entirely on the parties’ will, 
instituting arbitration proceedings against the other Sta-
te Party (to force it to state its authentic interpretation) 
fails to acknowledge that the latter is a prerogative (and 
not an obligation). This is particularly true when such 
State Party objects to the jurisdiction of  the Arbitral 
Tribunal on the basis of  absence of  will with regard 
to an authorized interpretation being imposed upon 
them. Consequently, this particular case differs from 
the previously referred situation, in which the Republic 
of  Peru instituted proceedings against the Republic of  
Chile. It should be noted, however, that such circums-
tances are, again, different from the issue of  the effects 
of  the declination (to furnish express observations on 
its authentic interpretation), for the State Party that was 
not a party to the dispute but was given a procedural 
opportunity to do so.
Finally, as to the third issue (genuine or alleged col-
lective authentic interpretations, after the investment ar-
bitration proceedings have been concluded and, eviden-
tly, a final authorized interpretation has been issued for 
the purposes of  the dispute), some considerations are to 
be presented. To date, there is no case in which a State 
Party to an investment treaty has instituted proceedin-
gs against the other State Party (before an international 
adjudicatory mechanism38 and after Investor-State arbi-
tration proceedings have been formally concluded39) for 
the purposes of  obtaining a new authorized interpreta-
tion of  the previously interpreted conventional clause.
Such situation would, undoubtedly, present com-
plex questions with respect to, inter alia, good faith. It 
would present an additional, perhaps lesser significant, 
ments/1498
38 The notion of  “international adjudicatory mechanisms”, naturally, ex-
cludes political means for the settlement of  disputes (which may or 
may not be public), such as direct Inter-State negotiations and/or 
consultations through the diplomatic channels.
39 By means of  the issuance of  a procedural order or a final award, 
which – thus – excludes the rendering of  partial awards (however 
prominent or significant they may be, inter alia, liability awards).
concern on res judicata, because, as the parties to the dis-
pute would not be the same and the question presented 
before the international adjudicatory mechanism would 
differ from the original proceeding. This does not mean 
the matter possesses or presents no complexities. It may 
even impair considerably the Investor-State dispute re-
solution mechanism. Consequently, the act of  raising 
the existence of  alleged or genuine collective authentic 
interpretations should occur before the Investor-State 
arbitral proceedings have formally concluded. Towar-
ds that aim, States Parties are free to pursue whiche-
ver mean they deem appropriate, not limited to con-
sultations and negotiations (through the appropriate 
diplomatic channels, though enshrined in a subsequent 
agreement), but also encompassing the commencement 
of  parallel Inter-State dispute resolution mechanisms 
(as long as the other State concurs in the aim of  seeking 
an authorized interpretation). 
Although – as discussed in Section 4 infra – some 
procedural mechanisms allow for the eventual “canali-
zation” of  authentic interpretations of  States Parties in 
Investor-State arbitration proceedings, such provisions 
fall short on assigning concrete procedural consequen-
ces to the occurrence of  circumstances in which States 
Parties (concurring on the affirmation that an investor’s 
claim is not encompassed in their common understan-
ding or intent of  the conventional clause), convey such 
binding statement40 to the Investor-State Arbitral Tri-
bunal.
4  Procedural mechanisms to 
canalize authentic interpretations 
in international arbitration 
proceedings41
Intrinsically linked to the discussion on an authori-
zed interpretation of  a conventional clause (when the 
States Parties to the treaty have no different, divergent, 
conflicting or opposed authentic interpretations and 
where the practice of  international arbitral tribunals 
40 On their authentic interpretation. 
41 It is worth noting that some of  the procedural mechanisms 
which are presented in this Section were “incorporated” after some of  
the awards were rendered within the cases referred in Section 3 su-
pra. These circumstances have no impact on the reflections thereby 
offered nor on the observations hereby referred.
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excludes omissions to refer to prior decisions), is the 
question of  the mechanisms by which a genuine col-
lective authentic interpretation may be conveyed to the 
Arbitral Tribunal.
Some of  the most recent conventional investment 
regimes42 incorporate provisions expressly allowing the 
other State Party (Home State), which is not a party to 
the dispute) to present written or oral submissions be-
fore the Arbitral Tribunal “on the interpretation” of  the 
international instrument43. 
Likewise, certain procedural rules44 applicable to 
Investor-State arbitration proceedings, enshrine me-
chanisms for “non-disputing parties” (which are often 
described as “persons or entities”, thus, encompassing a 
broader scope than just the other State Party) to file writ-
ten submissions, contingent upon the meeting of  certain 
conditions. Similarly, certain rule-modification proposals 
(unsuccessfully) attempt to deal with this issue.45
Both types of  provisions: (a) are optional not com-
pulsory and (b) although they reference the particular 
42 See, inter alia, Article 10.20, Section 2, of  the United States – Co-
lombia Trade Promotion Agreement (2006), which is the most recent free 
trade agreement –with an Investment Chapter– that has entered into 
force for the United States of  America. See also Article 10.20, Section 
2, of  the Additional Protocol to the Framework Agreement on the Pacific Alli-
ance (2014), as an example of  a non-bilateral free trade agreement (in-
cluding an Investment Chapter) that has recently entered into force. 
43 In the Author’s view, the mere absence of  express provisions in 
relation to authentic interpretation by States Parties do not preclude, 
under international law, the exercise of  such prerogative by those 
original subjects of  international law. As a prerogative of  States Par-
ties, an authentic interpretation can be exercised, at any moment (as 
long as the treaty is in force), by means deemed most appropriate. 
An express provision to that end does not change the interpreta-
tion’s legal nature as a States Parties’ prerogative (unless, of  course, 
the lexicon employed reflects imperative language towards that end). 
Nevertheless, in the realm of  international investment law – consid-
ering certain deficiencies contained in the cases referred in Section 3 
supra –, the inclusion of  such provisions was aimed at an illustrious 
– and not entirely useless – purpose. However, such clauses (see infra 
note 45) fall short on assigning concrete (and required) procedural 
consequences.
44 See, inter alia, Article 37, Section 2, of  the Rules of  Procedure for 
Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) of  the International Center 
for Settlement of  Investment Disputes (2006).
45 By way of  example, ICSID’s on-going rule-amendment process 
contemplates the possibility for a non-disputing State Party to a trea-
ty to issue (and convey) a unilateral interpretation of  a conventional 
clause in the course of  an arbitration in which the relevant treaty has 
been invoked against the other State Party. Nevertheless, the cur-
rent draft article (Proposal Rule 49: “Participation of  Non-disputing 
Treaty Party”) fails to provide the procedural consequences (as well 
as the legal value) of  such intervention vis-à-vis the specific arbitration 
proceedings. 
“value”46, they do not assign a legal consequence to the 
latter. These circumstances have a reflection on “what” 
is conveyed to the Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal: an 
individual authentic interpretation of  the State Party 
(Home State) that conflicts with that of  the other State 
Party (Host State) will have, inevitably, a different asses-
sment than a collective authentic interpretation47 – or 
even an individual authentic interpretation of  the State 
Party (Home State) that coincides with that of  the other 
State Party (Host State).
The first situation (submission of  a different indivi-
dual authentic interpretation by the State Party, which is 
not a party to the dispute), will have no impact on the in-
vestment arbitration proceedings and on the authorized 
interpretation that the Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal 
should issue, consistent with what has been presented 
throughout this Article. The second situation (submis-
sion of  a genuine collective authentic interpretation or 
an individual authentic interpretation that coincides 
with that the State Party which is a party to the dispute) 
should preclude the issuance of  an authorized inter-
pretation by the Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal in the 
sense of  moving forward with the proceedings. As has 
been previously suggested and indicated in this Article, 
this is, precisely, the type of  provision that investment 
treaties and applicable procedural rules are lacking.
5  Silence by the other State 
Party and/or non-submittal of 
observations reflective of authentic 
interpretation
Evidently, if  the State Party (Host State, which is a 
party to the dispute) has no claim about the investment 
treaty being potentially interpreted in an “inconsistent 
46 Some of  the ordinary conventional clauses that do provide a 
clarification on the “value” read as follows: “a joint decision of  the Par-
ties, each acting through its representative designated for purposes of  this Article, 
declaring their interpretation of  a provision of  this Treaty shall be binding 
on a tribunal” or an “interpretation by the Commission of  a provision of  
this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Section”. 
Evidently, they fall short on assigning concrete procedural conse-
quences to the occurrence of  those circumstances (beyond the value 
thereby referred).
47 Such as the one that arises from “a joint decision of  the Parties, 
each acting through its representative designated for purposes of  this Article, 
declaring their interpretation of  a provision of  this Treaty shall be binding on 
a tribunal”.
D
ÍA
Z
-C
E
D
IE
L,
 S
an
tia
go
. A
rb
itr
al 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
of
 in
ve
st
m
en
t t
re
at
ies
: p
ro
bl
em
s a
nd
 re
m
ed
ies
 fo
r t
he
 d
eb
at
e 
on
 “
leg
iti
m
ac
y”
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
16
, n
. 1
, p
. 7
3-
88
, 2
01
9
84
manner” with the collective authentic interpretation; or 
if  the relevant “materials”48 of  the case (not just some 
of  the proceedings) are not public and the State Party 
(Host State, which is a party to the dispute) did not re-
quest49 the authentic interpretation of  the other State 
Party (which is not a party to the dispute), the latter 
should be relieved of  any adverse construction of  the 
relevant treaty clause. 
But, what should happen when all of  the relevant 
materials of  the case are public (the other State Party 
being, thus, aware of  the commencement of  the pro-
ceedings) and a potential misinterpretation of  a con-
ventional clause (by means of  an authorized interpreta-
tion) is plausible in such case, but the other State Party 
chooses not to file a written observation (or otherwise 
communicate the authentic interpretation). Similarly, 
what should happen when that State Party (which is not 
a party to the dispute) is invited by the Investor-State 
Arbitral Tribunal to submit written observations but 
chooses not to furnish them or otherwise communicate 
the authentic interpretation? 
Silence is strange to good faith. Good faith is a well-
-known and well-established principle of  international 
law, reflected in the Vienna Convention of  the Law of  Trea-
ties (1969). For a State Party to remain silent when other 
State Party (in a bilateral treaty), raises a question on 
the common understanding of  what was agreed or what 
was encompassed on a conventional clause (in light of  a 
specific and substantial concern over a misconstruction 
of  the provision) is both unnatural and anomalous. A 
continued meeting of  the minds is essential to prevent the 
erosion of  consent. 
Some commentators suggest that remaining silent 
in those circumstances is perfectly acceptable in light 
of  the goal of  “depolitization” of  disputes (which, in 
their view, is almost a carte blanche for relieving the State 
Party – that is not a party to a dispute – from everything 
that binds it under the investment treaty in force). This 
48 The term “materials” is employed by, amongst others, the In-
ternational Center for Settlement of  Investment Disputes, to refer 
to Requests for Arbitration, Statements of  Defense, Memorials and 
Counter-Memorials, Procedural Orders, Expert Opinions, Witness 
Statements, Awards and all other relevant documents pertaining to 
a case.
49 The State Party’s request may be submitted (to the other State 
Party, which is not a party to the dispute) via the Investor-State Ar-
bitral Tribunal or, in parallel, by virtue of  the exercise of  its pre-
rogatives as an original subject of  international law, directly, through 
diplomatic channels.
is not a reasonable assertion when a situation like the 
above-referred occurs, in which the stability of  consent 
and/or of  the common understanding is in question.
The goal of  depolitization of  disputes cannot be 
achieved successfully without an “on-going confiden-
ce in shared interpretation”, together with effectively 
addressing the concern of  an authorized interpretation 
colliding with the collective interpretation of  the States 
Parties. As mentioned before in this Article, an authori-
zed interpretation by an Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal 
that does not reflect or is compatible with the genuine 
collective interpretation of  the States Parties not only 
diminishes the investment treaty itself, but – in fact – 
brings politics back to the realm of  international invest-
ment law.  
The so-called “stability” of  the Investor-State dis-
pute settlement mechanism cannot ignore or clash with 
the actual stability of  the treaty – which is the basis, 
foundation, raison d’être and legal underpinning of  the 
Investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. Silence, 
when a procedural opportunity is given to the other 
State Party50, should entail concrete consequences, as it 
may affect such stability.51 
Silence from the other State Party (which is not par-
ty to the dispute), when all of  the relevant materials of  
the case are public and when there is a clear and present 
concern over the misinterpretation of  a conventional 
clause (by means of  an authorized interpretation); or 
when such State Party is invited by the Investor-State 
Arbitral Tribunal to submit written observations but 
chooses not to furnish them (or otherwise communica-
te the authentic interpretation); should make very diffi-
cult for that State Party to elude acquiescence when the 
circumstances described in  paragraph 5 of  Section 2.3 
of  this Article occur.
50 Which is not a party to the dispute.
51 It is well known that, under general international law, investors 
(natural or juridical persons) do not have ius standi as they do not 
entail the legal nature of  subjects of  international law. Under cer-
tain conventional regimes of  the realm of  international investment 
law (e.g. ICSID or the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal) they 
do, however, have (limited) ius standi by virtue of  States Parties’ will 
(as expressed in the relevant treaty). The authentic interpretation of  
States Parties, thus, has a considerable impact on the role investors 
may play on the basis of  that same treaty.  
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6  The absence of provisions on 
the consequences of collective 
authentic interpretations 
submittals and silence
As evidenced in Section 4 supra, the current availa-
ble procedural mechanisms to canalize authentic inter-
pretations in international arbitration proceedings fall 
short on assigning concrete procedural consequences 
to the occurrence of  those circumstances52. The event 
in which a genuine collective authentic interpretation is 
submitted, or the situation in which an individual au-
thentic interpretation (that coincides with that of  the 
State Party which is a party to the dispute) is conveyed, 
should – without any space for doubt – preclude the is-
suance of  an authorized interpretation by the Investor-
-State Arbitral Tribunal. If  the States Parties concur on 
the affirmation that an investor’s claim is not encom-
passed in their common understanding or intent of  the 
conventional clause53, a subsequent authorized inter-
pretation has no further room. This means, in relation 
to the Investor-State Arbitration proceedings, that the 
claim should be dismissed. 
As discussed, this is, precisely, the type of  provision 
that investment treaties and applicable procedural rules 
lack. Section 7 infra, will present an appropriate recom-
mendation that aims to propose a concrete remedy to 
these problematic circumstances.
In accordance with this Article’s prior discussion54 a 
continued meeting of  the minds is essential to prevent 
the erosion of  consent in bilateral treaties. Under the 
understanding that silence is strange to good faith, in 
the event a situation corresponding to the description 
of  paragraph 5 of  Section 2.355 supra occurs, and:
The other State Party (which is not party to the dis-
pute) remained silent when all of  the relevant materials 
52 With regard to the continuation of  the Investor-State arbitration 
proceedings.
53 That is, if  the States Parties agree that the claim of  an investor 
should be dismissed.
54 See Section 5 supra.
55 An investor of  a State Party brings a claim against the other 
State Party and a construction of  a clause of  the applicable invest-
ment treaty is provided by an Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal. At 
a later time, the investor of  the latter State (no longer Host State, 
now Home State) brings a claim against the first State Party and the 
new dispute revolves around the same conventional clause that was 
previously interpreted by an Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal.
of  the case were public (and there was a clear and pre-
sent concern over the misinterpretation of  a conventio-
nal clause, by means of  the authorized interpretation of  
the Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal), or
The other State Party (which is not party to the dis-
pute) remained silent when the Investor-State Arbitral 
Tribunal extended an invitation for it to submit written 
observations on its authentic interpretation (or otherwi-
se failed to communicate the authentic interpretation 
of  the relevant conventional clause, when there was a 
clear and present concern over the misinterpretation of  
a conventional clause, by means of  the authorized inter-
pretation of  the Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal).
Acquiescence should be a strong presumption, with 
the highest possible threshold on eventual circumven-
tion. Consequently, Section 7 infra, will – likewise – pre-
sent an appropriate recommendation to this regard.
7  Conclusions and final remarks56: the 
recommended remedies 
The current debate on the convenience, legitimacy 
and balance of  the Investor-State dispute settlement 
mechanism, naturally, encompasses an enormous num-
ber of  concerns from “key players” across the globe. 
As long as the Investor-State dispute settlement me-
chanism continues to be based and established through 
conventional means, authorized interpretations perfor-
med by Investor-State Arbitral Tribunals, in the circu-
mstances and scenarios which have been the object of  
this Article, remain relevant57.
With regard to treaty law vis-à-vis the (imperfect) 
authorized interpretation of  Investor-State Arbitral 
Tribunals, the “on-going confidence in shared interpre-
tation” has been cited as crucial for the international 
instrument to continue in force, considering the will 
of  States Parties may be volatile or prone to change. 
56 Evidently, this Article did not purport to refer or consider issues 
related to the interpretation of  contracts between an investor and an 
entity or organ of  the State (or the State itself). Such matters were 
and remain outside the scope of  the scrutiny hereby undertaken.
57 Evidently, the matter was not overcome with the inclusions – in 
investment treaties – of  the following clauses: “The non-disputing Party 
may make oral and written submissions to the tribunal regarding the interpreta-
tion of  this Treaty” and “A joint decision of  the Parties, each acting through its 
representative designated for purposes of  this Article, declaring their interpreta-
tion of  a provision of  this Treaty shall be binding on a tribunal”.
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As bilateral treaties require to a greater extent58 than 
multilateral Parties a continued meeting of  the min-
ds or common understanding on what was agreed on 
each conventional clause, if  an Investor-State Arbitral 
Tribunal’s authorized interpretation of  a provision does 
not consult the collective authentic interpretation the 
consent erodes.
Consequently, this Article affirmed in the event a 
collective authentic interpretation (by all of  the States 
Parties) was presented – where (evidently) no different, 
divergent, conflicting or opposed views between the 
subjects of  international law for whom the treaty is in 
force exist59 – the Arbitral Tribunal should be precluded 
from issuing an authorized interpretation. Absent a ge-
nuine collective authentic interpretation60, however, the 
presumption should be that individual authentic inter-
pretations are opposed61 and, consequently, the Arbitral 
Tribunal must issue an authorized interpretation.
Under the premise of  Inter-State arbitration being a 
legitimate dispute settlement mechanism in internatio-
nal law and considering States Parties are free to pursue 
whichever means they deem appropriate for reconci-
ling their different, divergent, conflicting or opposed 
authentic interpretations, they may engage not only in 
consultations and negotiations (through the appropria-
te diplomatic channels, though conveying a subsequent 
agreement), but in parallel Inter-State dispute resolution 
mechanisms62. An Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal hea-
ring the dispute between an investor of  that State Party 
and the other State Party, should accord the appropriate 
deference to the implications of  an authorized inter-
pretation being requested by the two States Parties to 
58 Considering that, inter alia, reservations or conditional interpre-
tative declarations (as some of  the most prominent international 
law mechanisms) are not applicable – like is the case in multilateral 
treaties.
59 Naturally, on the basis of  the collective authentic interpreta-
tion differing and opposing the views or position of  the investor (as 
party to the dispute).
60 That is, when only one of  the States Parties alleges the existence 
of  a collective authentic interpretation, without there being a prima 
facie subsequent written agreement between the States Parties.
61 Which means that the opposing or conflicting views of  the In-
vestor, on the one hand, and Host State, on the other, match or mir-
ror opposing or conflicting the States Parties’ individual authentic 
interpretations.
62 In accordance with Section 3 supra, the submittal of  a claim to 
Inter-State Arbitration must occur prior to the formal conclusion of  
the Investor-State arbitration proceedings. Likewise, the other State 
must concur in the aim of  seeking an authorized interpretation (and 
not object to the jurisdiction of  the Inter-State Arbitral Tribunal).
the investment treaty (in light of  their different, diver-
gent, conflicting or opposed authentic interpretations), 
over its own (imperfect) authorized interpretation for 
the separate dispute. In accordance with Section 3 supra, 
seeking to find additional assurances on the common 
understanding – when the meeting of  the minds is in 
question – is far from “political”.
Thus, an a contrario perception cannot invalidate or 
ignore the fact that an investment treaty binds the States 
Parties, and it is their mutual comprehension on “what 
are” the agreed international conventional obligations 
that gives rise to (eventual) subsequent breaches to an 
investor. If  the States Parties agree that a particular si-
tuation or set of  facts are not, without reasonable dou-
bt, encompassed under a conventional clause (and, the-
refore, an authorized interpretation on their different, 
divergent, conflicting or opposed authentic interpreta-
tions is solicited), the Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal 
should not move forward with separate proceedings. 
Moreover, if  the States Parties concur on the affirma-
tion that an investor’s claim is not encompassed in their 
common understanding or intent of  the conventional 
clause63, a subsequent authorized interpretation has no 
room. The relevant part of  the claim (or, eventually, the 
entire claim if  circumstances so provide), must be dis-
missed.
As the current available procedural mechanisms to 
canalize authentic interpretations in international arbi-
tration proceedings fall short on assigning concrete pro-
cedural consequences to the occurrence of  those circu-
mstances64, this Article recommends the inclusion of  a 
provision65 reflective of  the following rationale, aiming 
at offering a remedy in the debate on the convenience, 
legitimacy and balance of  the Investor-State dispute set-
tlement mechanism:
“No claim may be submitted to arbitration under 
this Section or be considered by an Arbitral Tribunal 
established under this Section, if  the Parties, by writ-
63 That is, if  the States Parties agree that the claim of  an investor 
should be dismissed.
64 And, likewise, the ordinary conventional clauses referred in supra 
note 46.
    fall short on assigning concrete procedural consequences to the 
occurrence of  those circumstances (beyond the value thereby re-
ferred).
65 This provision is drafted and envisioned for bilateral investment 
treaties. Nevertheless, it may very well be incorporated – mutatis 
mutandis – in institutional or ad hoc procedural rules, although (it is 
acknowledged that) such process may be more complex.
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ten binding arrangement, agree that the claim should 
be dismissed”.
Considering that the continued meeting of  the min-
ds is essential to prevent the erosion of  consent in bi-
lateral treaties. Under the understanding that silence is 
strange to good faith, in the event a situation corres-
ponding to the description of  paragraph 5 of  Section 
2.3 supra occurs – in accordance with Section 6 supra 
– acquiescence should be a strong presumption, with 
the highest possible threshold on eventual elusion. Con-
sequently, this Article recommends the inclusion of  a 
provision66 reflective of  the following rationale, aiming 
at offering a remedy in the debate on the convenience, 
legitimacy and balance of  the Investor-State dispute set-
tlement mechanism:
In any arbitration conducted under this Section, 
at the request of  any party, an Arbitral Tribunal 
shall so notify the non-disputing Party with a view 
to invite it to furnish oral or written submissions 
regarding the interpretation of  this Treaty. If  
the non-disputing Party declines to submit such 
observations or does not otherwise furnish 
observations regarding the interpretation of  this 
Treaty, the non-disputing Party shall be presumed, 
for the purposes of  this Treaty, to have acquiesced 
to the interpretation of  this Treaty.
As a final reflection, it should be noted that  major 
“concern” over what States Parties might or not engage 
in (or do), after these inclusions take place67, should be 
completely absent from the discussion68. Such personal 
perceptions are not a juridical matter – rather a ques-
tion of  political expediency – and, as such, the conjec-
tures or speculations on a supposed “disturb to arbitration 
guarantees”69 are not appropriate.
Likewise, it is worth mentioning that this Article’s 
recommendations are not to be read as “advocacy for di-
plomatic protection”70. Rather, they purport to address a 
concern on the possibilities of  misconstruction of  con-
ventional clauses by Investor-State Arbitral Tribunals 
66 Id.
67 By means of, inter alia, the adoption and subsequent entry into 
force of  an amendment to the relevant investment treaty, or the 
conclusion and ratification of  a new investment treaty.
68 Likewise, as a non-legal matter, it should be absent from an 
Investor-State Arbitral Tribunal’s reasoning. 
69 See REISMAN, W. Michael. Opinion with respect to jurisdic-
tion in the Interstate Arbitration initiated by Ecuador against the 
United States, 2012. Available at: https://www.italaw.com/cases/
documents/1498 
70 Nor for a “re-politization” of  international investment disputes 
(consonant with Section 3 supra).
occurring71 (under the very specific circumstances or 
scenarios addressed as problematic), while distancing 
themselves from the so-called “destructive criticism” 
(which, unfortunately, prevails in the ordinary approach 
of  the subject-matter). Accordingly, this Article’s pro-
posal of  concrete alternatives (recommendations) aims 
to strengthen the Investor-State dispute settlement me-
chanism.
In this “golden age” for investment arbitration, whe-
re the proliferation of  investment treaties is expected to 
continue, the linked increase in the submittal of  claims 
is likewise forecasted to grow, and the convenience, le-
gitimacy and balance of  the Investor-State dispute set-
tlement mechanism will continue to be central in the 
debate, arbitral interpretation is at a crossroads. Would 
the problem be maintained or would the remedy be em-
braced?
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